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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
This case involves the license suspension of Appellee/Petitioner Susan Jane Warner ("Warner")

following a DUL Warner unsuccessfolly challenged her suspension to the Idaho Department of
Transportation ("Department") and then filed this case in Blaine County for judicial review of the
Department's decision. The District Court vacated the suspension and the Depmtment appeals.

B.

Course of Proceedings.
On September 23, 2014, the Depmtmenl issued a Notice of Suspension ("Notice"), suspending

Warner's license for one year. Amended Agency Record ("AR"). at 2-4. 1 Warner requested a hearing
on October 1, 2014. Id. at 5. A hearing was held on October 16, 2014. Id. at 25. The hearing officer,
Michael B. Howell ("Hearing Officer") upheld the suspension on October 31, 2014. Id. at 27.
Thereafter, Warner submitted a Petition for Reconsideration. Id. at 30-34. The Hearing Officer denied
Warner's petition on November 15, 2014. Id. at 41. Warner filed a Petition for Judicial Review on
December 4, 2014. R. 3. The District Court reduced the license suspension from one year for a second
DUI to thirty days for a first DUI. Id. at 101-102.

C.

Statement of Facts.
On July 9, 2012, Warner was convicted of driving under the influence ("DUI") in Idaho. AR.

25; See also AR. 9, 36. On April 5, 2014, Warner was involved in a single-car accident in Montana. Id.
at 35-36. It appeared that Warner had veered off the highway, hit a concrete barrier, and then ended up

1

Upon preparing this brief, counsel noticed that the Amended Agency Record was not included in the Record on
Appeal. The Amended Agency Record was requested in the Notice of Appeal. R.115. The Court has granted the
parties' stipulation to augment the record to include the Amended Agency Record and agency hearing transcript.
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back on the highway. Id. Warner was detained and given a breath test, which produced a blood alcohol
content ("BAC") of .179. Id. After being transported to the Madison Valley Medical Center for
evaluation, Warner consented to a blood draw. Id. Her blood draw later revealed a BAC of .176. /d.
Warner was cited for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol-2"ct offense, in violation of Montana Code
Annotated ("MCA")§ 61-8-401(l)(a). Id.
On July 23, 2014, the State of Montana amended the charge against Warner to Aggravated DUI
(BAC in excess of .16), in violation of MCA§ 61-8-465(1)(a). Id. at 22. On September 16, 2014,
Warner pied guilty to the Aggravated DUI charge. Id. at 21. On or about September 22, 2014, the
Department received notice of Warner's Montana Aggravated DUI conviction. Id. at 1. On September
23, 2014, the Department issued the Notice, suspending Warner's license for one year. Id. at 2-4.
Warner requested a hearing on October 1, 2014. Id. at 5. A hearing was held on October 16, 2014. Id. at
25. At the Hearing, Warner argued that "the aggravated DUI in - - Montana is a different statute than
aggravated DUI in Idaho." A. Tr.at 2-3. Warner continued arguing that because the excessive DUI in
Idaho required a BAC of .20, the aggravated DUI in Montana only required a .16, and Warner's BAC
was approximately .17, the excessive DUI statute could not serve as a basis for her year-long
suspension in Idaho. Id. Warner also argued "in order for it to be a year suspension under Idaho, the
Court has to - - it has to be a conviction for a second offense DUI, not a - - not just a happens to be a
second offense." Id. at 4. The Hearing Officer upheld the suspension on October 31, 2014. AR. 27.
Thereafter, Warner submitted a Petition for Reconsideration. Id. at 30-34. The Hearing Officer denied
Warner's petition on November 15, 2014. Id. at 41. Warner filed her Petition for Judicial Review on
December 4, 2014. R. at 3. The District Court dete1mined that even though the Montana DUI was
Warner's second in ten years, the Department "must confine Warner's license suspension to the
APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 2

maximum penalty for the offense to which Warner pied guilty pursuant to § 18-8005. That is a first
offense DUL" Id. at 101.

II.

STANDARD OJ<' REVIEW

The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of department
decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a person's driver's license. See Idaho
Code §§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-520 I (2), 67-5270; See also, In re Suspension of Driver's License of

Gibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 941, 155 P.3d 1176, 1180 (Ct. App. 2006). An administrative driver's
license suspension '"is a ci vii penalty separate and apart from any other suspension imposed for a
violation of other Idaho motor vehicle codes or for a conviction of an offense." Tn re Bowman, 135
Idaho 843, 845, 25 P.3d 866,868 (Ct. App. 2001). "In an appeal from the decision of the district
court acting in its appellate capacity under ID APA, [the appellate court] reviews the agency record
independently of the district court's decision." Stale 71-amp. Dept. v. Kalani-Keegan, 155 Idaho 297,
300, 311 P.3d 309, 312 (2013). A court may ove1turn an agency's decision only when the agency's
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b)
exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawfol procedure; (cl) are not supported
by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Idaho
Code § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency
erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code section 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that patty
has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette County Bd. ofCounty Comm 'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429, 958 P.2d
583, 586 (1998); See also, In re Marshall, 137 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct. App. 2002); In

re Beyer, 155 Idaho 40, 44,304 P.3d 1206, 1210 (Ct. App. 2013).
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III.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

Warner committed a DUI in Montana, which was her second DUI in Jess than two years, and
her license was administratively suspended for one year. After the Hearing Officer upheld the one-year
suspension and Warner petitioned for judicial review, the district court posed the issue as "what penalty
would have definitely been imposed based upon the conviction , not what penalty could have or
probably would have been imposed if Warner received this DUI while driving in Idaho." R. 98. The
Hearing Officer correctly applied the statutes while the di strict court inappropriately focused on the
criminal conviction and penalties thereto instead of viewing the suspension in the civil remedy context
it belongs.
A.

THE HEARING OFFICER CORRECTLY SUSPENDED WARNER'S LICENSE FOR
ONE YEAR.
In hi s decision, the Hearing Officer detem1ined that whether or not Montana considered the

Montana DUI a second DUI conviction was irrelevant for the administrative suspension. Id. at 26-27.
The Hearing Officer identified two code sections that authorized the civil suspension of Warner's
license. Id. at 27. The first statute was Idaho Code secti on 49-324 which states that the Department
shall suspend , disqualify or revoke the driver's license or privilege of any resident of
this state or the privilege of a nomesident to operate a motor vehicle in this state upon
receiving notice of the conviction, administrati ve action, or court order of that person in
another state or jurisdiction of an offense which, if committed in this state, would be
grounds for the suspension, disqualification or revocation of the driver' s license and
privileges of the driver. The department shall forward a certified copy or electronic
transfer to the national driver register.
(Emphasis added). The second was Idaho Code section 49-326( 1)(e) which states that the Depai1ment
is authorized to suspend, disqualify or revoke the license or privileges of a driver
without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence
that the driver: .. . [h]as committed an offense in ai1other state or jurisdiction as

APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 4

evidenced by a conviction, comt order or administrative action, which if committed in
Idaho would be grounds for suspension, disqualification or revocation ...
(Emphasis added). The Hearing Officer noted that Idaho Code section 18-8005(e) provided for a oneyear suspension for a second DUI offense (within ten years). Id. In her Motion/or Reconsideration,
Warner argued that the Montana conviction was for a "first time offender in Montana" and that Warner
could only be subject to a thirty-day suspension.

Id. at 32, 34. In his Order on Motion for

Reconsideration, the Hearing Officer "reiterate[ d] that the actual alcohol concentration of the driver at
the time of her arrest in Montana and whether or not the Montana court treated the conviction as a first
or subsequent conviction are irrelevant." 2 Id. at 41. The Hearing Officer was correct.
The Depaitment is required to focus on the act ofa DUI in suspending a license without regard
to how the foreign jurisdiction charges or puni shes the DUI. Both Idaho Code sections 49-324 and 49326 focus on the "offense" conunitted. "The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly
expressed legislative intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results." Bowman, 135
Idaho at 845, 25 P.3d at 868. "Offense" is defined as "a violation of the law. " BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10111 ed. 2014). "Commit" is defined as, " to perpetrate (a crime)." Id. "Perpetrate" is
defined as "to commit or carry out (an act, esp. a crime)." Id. In focusing on the offense committed, the
legislature intended that the Depa1tment look at the underlying acts of the Jaw violation and not what
penalties were imposed in a foreign conviction or the fo1m of the conviction.

2

The reference to the alcohol concentration raises a seemingly contradictory position taken by Warner at the
administrative hearing. Warner was convicted in Montana of an aggravated DUI and argued that since the aggravated
DUI in Montana had a threshold of a BAC of .16 and the excessive DUI in Idaho had a threshold of .20, Warner could
not be subject to the Idaho excessive DUI enhancement because her BAC was on ly .17. Then Warner argued that since
she was not convicted ofa second DUI, she could not be subject to the enhancement for a second DUI in Idaho even
though it was her second DUI. Therefore, Warner took the position (aggravated DUI) that the court must look at the
underlying facts and ignore the face of the conviction and also took the opposite position (first or second DUI) that the
Department was limited by the face of the conviction. See A. Tr. 2-4.
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The offense committed by Warner in Montana was simply a DUI. In State v. Schall, 157 Idaho
488, __ , 337 P.3d 647,651 (2014), the Supreme Corn1 addressed whether Idaho Code section 188005(6) (third or subsequent DUI) created a separate and distinct offense or consisted of enhancement
provisions for a DUI offense. The Court looked at the section title, "Penalties," and Idaho Code section
18-8005(8), which characterizes subsections 4, 6, and 9 as "enhancement[s]," and determined, along
with other reasons, that the provision for a third or subsequent DUI was an enhancement provision and
not a separate and distinct offense. Id. at 651-52. The Court made clear "that in a prosecution pursuant
to Idaho Code section 18-8005(6) [for a third or subsequent DUI] the offense at issue is the violation

of Idaho Code section 18-8004 [DUI] and that very offense may be charged either as a
misdemeanor or a felony depending upon the defendant's prior criminal history." Id. at 652
(emphasis added). Therefore, the DUI is the offense and whether it is a first, second, or third DUI does
not constitute different offenses but only affects the sentencing enhancements in criminal cases.
Put another way, a first DUI is not a separate offense from a second or subsequent DUI. There
is no "DUI-Second" offense or "DUI-First" offense. In fact, in DUI cases, a jmy first determines
whether a defendant is guilty of a DUI before evaluating whether the DUI is the defendant's second, or
subsequent DUI for enhancement purposes. See Idaho Criminal Ju1y Instructions I 008. In the case
where the Department is involved, the Department first evaluates whether a DUI occurred (the offense
committed) and then assesses the appropriate suspension based upon how many previous DU!s the
person has.
While both Idaho Code sections 49-324 and 49-326 refer to convictions, such reference is not
for purposes oflimiting the Department and the State ofldaho's ability to suspend licenses as Warner
argued. Along with convictions, the statutes also reference administrative actions and orders. Requiring
APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 6

documentation of any of these to identify the "offense" "committed" is for evidentiaty purposes and
most likely serves to ensure that the Department utilizes reliable information when it suspends licenses.
Neither statute indicates in any way that the Department is limited by the form of the conviction, the
penalties imposed therein, the remedies taken in any administrative action, or the result of an order
from the foreign jurisdiction. Put simply, the statutes instruct the Depattment to use these reliable
foreign documents to find out what offense was committed and then impose the proper suspension
according to Idaho law without regard to the foreign penalties.
A logical reason for the emphasis on the "offense" "committed" as opposed to the "fonn of the
conviction" is that foreign DUI statutes and penalties may not coincide with Idaho's DUI statutes. This
case exemplifies that concern. 3 Warner's Montana DUI was clearly her second DUI within two years.
At first, Warner was cited with a DUI with the enhancement of it being her second DUI. However, that
was later amended to an aggravated DUI. As noted above, Montana's aggravated DUI is based upon a
different BAC than Idaho's excessive DUI. Additionally, there are differences between what prior DUI
convictions may be counted in Idaho and Montana. Compare Idaho Code§ 18-8005 with MCA§§ 618-714 and 61-8-722. For example, in Idaho, a conviction under 18-8004(1) (a), (b), and (c), along with
"substantially conforming foreign criminal violation(s)" within the past IO years are counted when
determining whether the present DUI is a second DUI. Idaho Code§ 18-8005(4). In Montana, all prior
Montana convictions are considered, regardless of when it occurred, and foreign DU Is appear to be

'The district court inco1Tectly stated that "[t]here ha[d] been no argument that the Montana code is not substantially
confonning, except as to the BAC required for an aggravated DUI" and found the statutes to be substantially
confonning. R. at 92. However, the Department addressed significant differences between Montana DUI statutes and
Idaho's. See R. 55 ("Warner is attempting to exploit the difference between Idaho DUI laws and Montana DUI
laws ... "); R. at 61 ("Montana's DUI laws are very different than Idaho's" followed by an analysis of those
differences which included the observation that Montana laws consider a DUI as a person's second only if the first

was also committed in Montana.).
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excluded from consideration. See MCA § 61-8-7 l 4(2)(a) ("a person convicted of a second violation of
61-8-401...); MCA § 61-8-401 (declaring it unlawfol to operate a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol "upon the way of this state open to the public"). Therefore, Warner's DUI did
constitute aggravated DUI in Montana but could not be punished as a second DUI in Montana as her
first DUI was not in Montana. However, had Warner committed the Montana DUI in Idaho, she could
not be charged with excessive DUI, but she would be subject to the enhanced DUI penalties for a
second DUL These jurisdictional differences are perfect examples as to why the legislature thought it
was prudent to have the Department focus on the "offense" "committed" as opposed to the form of the
conviction or penalties imposed by the foreign jurisdictions.
Recognizing that the offense was the DUI and not the Montana conviction or its penalties, the
Hearing Officer correctly determined that the Montana conviction evidenced that Warner committed a
DUI offense and, after noting that she had committed a DUI offense less than two years earlier,
co1Tectly applied the civil suspension for a second DUI enhancement.
H.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY FOCUSING ON THE FORM OF THE
CONVICTION AND TREATING THE SUSPENSION AS A CRIMINAL PENALTY.
Despite the clear language of the statutes, the district court focused on elements other than the

offense committed. Specifically, the district comi posed the issue as, "what penalty would have
definitely been imposed based upon the conviction, not what penalty could have or probably would
have been imposed if Warner received this DUI while driving in Idaho." R. 98. This perception is
incorrect for two reasons.
First, as noted above, the district court's focus on the conviction as opposed to the offense was
incorrect. The statutes do not instruct the Depmiment to focus on the conviction, but on the "offense"
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"committed." The offense was a DUI. The way in which the foreignjurisdiction charged or punished
the DUI was irrelevant.
Second, the district court's focus on the penalties available for the suspension misperceives the
nature of administrative hearings. An administrative driver's license suspension "is a civil penalty
separate and apart from any other suspension imposed for a violation of other Idaho motor vehicle
codes or for a conviction ofan offense." in re Bowman, 135 Idaho 843,845, 25 P.3d 866,868 (Ct.
App. 2001 ). The Court of Appeals has noted that "the state's interest in preventing intoxicated person
from driving far outweighs the individual's interest. .. " and that "the state has a strong remedial and
nonpunitive reason for suspending driver's licenses." Buell v. Idaho Department ofTransportation, 151
Idaho 257,263,254 P.3d 1253, 1259 (Ct. App. 2011). Administrative suspensions "serve to provide for
the safety of the public at-large." Id. Generally speaking, "Idaho appellate cou1is have not viewed
driver's license suspensions as punishment." Id.
The civil, nonpunitive, and remedial nature of administrative license suspensions is fwiher
evident in comparing the administrative license suspension statutes with the criminal penalty statutes
for DU!s. Idaho Code section l 8-8002A provides for automatic and immediate license suspensions of
those who fail BAC tests. Idaho Code section 18-8005 provides the penalties for DUI convictions.
There are no provisions in those statutes that provide for an overlapping offset. That means that a driver
who fails a BAC test may have his or her license suspended immediately pursuant to an administrative
license suspension and then have his or her license suspended again following a DUI conviction. To
treat the administrative license suspension as a criminal punishment, as the district court did, would be
to effectively consolidate civil and criminal suspensions--a consolidation that the legislature has not
created or intended.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 9

The administrative license suspension in this case is a civil, nonpunitive remedy, separate and
apart from the confines and restrictions in a criminal case. The district court etTed by focusing on the
conviction and treating this suspension as though it was a criminal punislunent.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the second time in less than two years, Warner operated a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol. The Hearing Officer correctly reviewed Warner's Montana conviction to ensure
that Warner had committed a DU[ in Montana, and then affirmed the civil one-year license suspension
because Warner had a previous DUI. The Court should reverse the district court's decision and reinstate
the license suspension.
DA TED this

·th
\1.:
day of December, 2015.

~
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~
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